By Yang Danzhi

楊丹志

On May 26, the multilateral exercise KAMANDAG, involving the armed forces of the US, Japan, the Philippines, and the ROK, officially commenced. For the first time, the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade of Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) will carry out joint operations with the ROK Marine Corps.

26日，美國、日本、菲律賓和韓國軍隊參與的“海上戰(zhàn)士合作”（KAMANDAG）多邊聯(lián)合演練正式開始。日本陸上自衛(wèi)隊“水陸機動團”將與韓國海軍陸戰(zhàn)隊開展首次聯(lián)合行動。

The strengthening of Japan-ROK defense cooperation is a direct result of Washington's push for the US-Japan-ROK trilateral and mini-lateral cooperative framework. The US is seeking to bind Japan and the ROK to its security strategy, treating them as appendages to its "Indo-Pacific Strategy" in order to maximize its control over the Asia-Pacific region. However, the political landscapes of all three countries have shifted significantly compared to the past. As a result, the prospects for further upgrading Japan-ROK defense cooperation remain uncertain.

日韓防務(wù)合作的強化，是美國力推美日韓“小三邊”機制的結(jié)果。美方試圖將日韓與其安全戰(zhàn)略進行捆綁，將兩國作為其“印太戰(zhàn)略”的附庸，最大限度地保證美國在亞太地區(qū)的控制力。但是，如今美日韓三國的政局與之前相比都發(fā)生了很大變化，日韓防務(wù)合作能否進一步升級，存在不少不確定性。

First, the next administration in the ROK may show less enthusiasm for strengthening defense cooperation with Japan. Currently, Lee Jae-myung, the presidential candidate from the Democratic Party of Korea, is leading in public opinion polls. He has stated that, if elected, he will pursue a policy of "pragmatic diplomacy," advancing relations with China, the US, Japan, and Russia based on the national interests and practical considerations of the ROK. He has also pledged to restore ROK-DPRK communication channels and advance inter-Korean dialogue. If he assumes office, the ROK would likely adopt a more cautious stance than the Yoon Suk-yeol administration on both defense cooperation with Japan and participation in US-Japan-ROK trilateral frameworks.

第一，下屆韓國政府對于強化韓日防務(wù)合作的意愿可能會減弱。目前，韓國共同民主黨總統(tǒng)候選人李在明民意支持率一馬當(dāng)先。他已表示將在當(dāng)選后采取“實用外交”策略，基于韓國國家利益與實用性，發(fā)展與中國、美國、日本、俄羅斯四國的關(guān)系。同時，李在明還承諾推進恢復(fù)朝韓溝通渠道，推動南北對話。若李在明上臺，韓國政府對于韓日防務(wù)合作的進展，以及在美日韓三邊合作中的參與程度，均可能會比尹錫悅政府時期更為謹慎。

Second, deep-rooted historical grievances and territorial disputes between Japan and the ROK have created a fragile foundation of public opinion for bilateral defense cooperation. Japan has long been criticized for its ambiguous stance and lack of genuine remorse over wartime issues, including the forced recruitment of comfort women and laborers during its colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula. These unresolved historical tensions have fueled long-standing resentment among people of the ROK, and related civil disputes could resurface at any time, directly affecting intergovernmental communication and cooperation. Meanwhile, the territorial dispute between the two countries has only been shelved, not resolved. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration previously faced sharp domestic backlashes for pursuing what many perceived as a "pro-Japan" policy. For instance, the decision to allow Japanese Self-Defense Forces temporary wartime access to the ROK to transport supplies for US troops stationed there sparked widespread public protests. In a political climate already unsettled by emergency martial law debates and presidential impeachment proceedings, the next ROK administration is likely to take public sentiment toward Japan more seriously as it seeks to consolidate its domestic support.

第二，日韓之間存在復(fù)雜的歷史問題和領(lǐng)土糾紛，兩國加強防務(wù)合作的民意基礎(chǔ)并不穩(wěn)固。因日本方面對其殖民侵略朝鮮半島時期強征“慰安婦”、強征勞工等歷史問題一直含糊其詞、缺乏反省，不少韓國民眾長期以來對日本極為不滿。因歷史問題造成的兩國民間糾紛隨時可能發(fā)酵，并將直接影響雙方官方層面的溝通和合作。同時，兩國領(lǐng)土爭端也只是暫時擱置，從未得到徹底解決。尹錫悅政府此前被批推行“媚日外交”，曾在韓國國內(nèi)引發(fā)民意強烈反彈。例如，韓方允許日本自衛(wèi)隊在戰(zhàn)時為駐韓美軍運送物資臨時進入韓國的決定，就遭到民眾的強烈抗議。在韓國社會已經(jīng)因緊急戒嚴事件和總統(tǒng)彈劾案出現(xiàn)不確定性的情況下，下一屆韓國政府可能會非常重視韓國社會對日本的態(tài)度，以穩(wěn)定其執(zhí)政基礎(chǔ)。

Third, a potential reduction in US involvement could weaken the momentum of Japan-ROK defense cooperation. Progress in Japan-ROK bilateral security ties has largely depended on active US mediation and pressure, which have been instrumental in mending strained relations and advancing defense coordination between the two countries. However, the new US administration's emphasis on "America First" suggests a shift toward prioritizing American interests within the trilateral framework, while showing reluctance to shoulder greater responsibilities. There are also signs that Washington may demand increased financial contributions from Tokyo and Seoul under the guise of security commitments. If the US adopts a more hands-off approach in the future, the Japan-ROK defense partnership – currently sustained primarily by external pressure – could face serious challenges in sustaining further development.

第三，美國投入的減少也可能弱化日韓防務(wù)合作力度。日韓防務(wù)合作能夠取得進展，美國發(fā)揮的作用不容小覷。美國的調(diào)節(jié)和施壓，對于兩國關(guān)系的修復(fù)及安全合作的強化至關(guān)重要。然而，新一屆美國政府強調(diào)“美國優(yōu)先”，在新的美日韓合作框架中想要謀取更多利益，不愿承擔(dān)過多義務(wù)，甚至以安全要挾日韓多出“保護費”。在美國可能當(dāng)“甩手掌柜”的情況下，重壓之下被捏合的日韓防務(wù)合作，未來能否繼續(xù)發(fā)展還有待觀察。

(The author is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies at Renmin University of China.)

（作者是中國人民大學(xué)國家安全研究院高級研究員）

Editor's Note: Originally published on huanqiu.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.